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Abstract
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on an entire group known to contain the offender. The advantages of .group punishment. are that the offender is punished with certainty and detection costs are
saved. The disadvantage is that innocent individuals are punished. We compare
individual and group punishment when social welfare depends on fairness, and
when it depends on deterrence. We show that group punishment may dominate
in the former case if the detection technology is ineffective but never in the latter
case. We discuss our results in the context of several examples.
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Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty:
The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment
1. Introduction
In standard economic models of law enforcement, the chief objective is first to
identify, and then punish, the offender.1 However, there are many enforcement contexts
in which the identity of the offender is uncertain, but he is known to be a member of a
well-defined group. Examples include a class prankster, a terrorist who is known to be a
member of a particular group or citizen of a certain country, and a polluter who is known
to be located within a particular geographic region. Under an “individual punishment”
strategy, the enforcement authority invests some resources in apprehending a suspect
from this group and then imposes a sanction (perhaps wrongly) on him. However, an
alternative punishment strategy is possible: namely, sanction all members of the group.
Examples of this sort of “group punishment” include punishing the entire class for the
actions of a prankster, sanctioning countries that harbor terrorists, imposing liability on a
group of firms for a spill caused by one of them, and, in primitive societies, retaliating
against an entire family or clan for the actions of one of its members.
In this paper we examine the conditions under which group punishment is
preferred over individual punishment. The benefits of group punishment include certain
punishment of the offender and reduced detection costs, while the chief drawback is the
cost associated with wrongful punishment of the innocent. To our knowledge, the

1

See, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) for a survey of this large literature, which originated with Becker
(1968).
1

economics literature on law enforcement has not systematically examined this question.2
There is, however, a related literature on “group incentives,” primarily in the context of
industrial organization and team production, where the threat of group penalties is used to
prevent shirking when the effort of team members is unobservable.3 Similar schemes
have been proposed for pollution control when the contribution of individual firms is
unobservable.4 The current model differs from these contexts in several ways. First, they
do not explicitly compare individual and group enforcement strategies. Second, they do
not ordinarily assume that there is a single offender. Instead, all workers are potential
shirkers and all firms are potential polluters. Thus, the decision of whether or not to be
an “offender” is made simultaneously by all members of the group, and, if all are
identical, all make the same decision (i.e., all are innocent or all are guilty). In contrast,
we assume there is a single offender who in effect “hides out” in a group of innocent
individuals.
In comparing individual and group punishment, we consider two different
measures of social welfare. One depends on the ex post fairness of sanctions—that is,
“fitting the punishment to the crime”—while the other depends on deterrence. (The costs
of enforcement and of punishing innocent individuals enter both versions.) Most
economic models of crime focus only on deterrence, though some have also incorporated
concerns about fairness.5 We consider both objectives because we believe that both are
relevant for understanding actual punishment strategies; indeed, we show that the
particular objective matters when evaluating the choice between individual and group
2

But see Levmore (1995a,b) for informal discussions of many of the issues addressed here as well as
numerous examples of group punishment.
3
See, e.g., Holmstrom (1982), Rasmusen (1987), and Varian (1990).
4
See Segerson (1988), Xepapadeas (1991), and Govindasamy, Herriges, and Shogren (1994).
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punishment. Moreover, the results are somewhat surprising. A priori, one might expect
that group punishment would be preferred when deterrence is the goal (since more
individuals face punishment), while individual punishment would be preferred when
fairness is the goal (since fewer innocent individuals are punished). However, our results
are in stark contrast to this. In particular, we show that, when punishment is random,
group punishment is preferred (if any punishment is desirable) when fairness is the goal,
while the two punishment schemes are equally desirable when deterrence is the goal.
When the enforcer can invest in detection, then individual punishment will always be
preferred under the deterrence goal, while the ranking of the two approaches under the
fairness objective will depend on the accuracy of the detection technology. The
explanation for these surprising results lies in the endogenous choice of the fine and
investment in detection under the two strategies. As it turns out, the conditions under
which we find group punishment to be preferred are especially descriptive of ancient
societies when group punishment was more pervasive than in modern law enforcement.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Sections 3
then analyzes the fairness version of the model, while Section 4 considers deterrence.
Section 5 examines several extensions of the basic model. Section 6 discusses various
examples of group punishment, from both ancient and modern law, in light of the model.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2. The Basic Model

5
6

See Miceli (1991) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000b).
See, for example, Posner (1983), especially Chapters 7 and 8.
3

Consider the following scenario. A single risk neutral individual has committed
an illegal act but his identity is unknown.7 However, he is known to be a member of a
group of size n>1.8 That is, n is defined to be the smallest group of which the offender is
known to be a member. The enforcer considers two punishment strategies. Under
individual punishment, the enforcer devotes resources to identifying a single suspect who
is then sanctioned. Under group punishment, in contrast, the enforcer imposes a uniform
sanction on all members of the group. We focus initially on monetary sanctions (fines)
but consider non-monetary sanctions in the discussion of extensions.
In comparing these punishment strategies, we consider two alternative social
goals regarding punishment. The first assumes that fairness of the sanction is the primary
measure of social welfare. This reflects the notion that the actual imposition of
punishment occurs after an offense has been committed and a suspect has been
apprehended. At that point, all considerations of deterrence of the offense in question are
irrelevant, leaving fairness in the treatment of the suspect as the primary concern. This
objective, as reflected by the notion of proportionality between punishment and crime,
has a long history in human society and is especially descriptive of primitive law
enforcement (Posner, 1983: Chapter 8). We then turn to the more conventional goal of
deterrence, which requires the enforcer to be able to precommit to imposing a particular
sanction regardless of any possible appearance of unfairness after the fact. Under both
objectives, we also consider the cost of wrongful punishment, primarily because this is
the most important objection to the use of group punishment.
The formal model makes use of the following notation:
7

In Section 5.4 we note the impact of different assumptions about the offender’s risk preference.
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FI =

fine imposed under individual punishment;

FG = fine imposed on all members of the group under group punishment;
p =

probability that the individual who is apprehended and punished under
individual punishment is the true offender;

c(p,n)=cost of apprehension, cp>0, cpp>0, cn>0, cpn>0;

σ =

scaling factor that reflects the social cost of imposing a $1 fine on an
innocent individual under either punishment strategy.

We introduce additional notation specific to the alternative versions of the model as
necessary below. The characteristics of the cost of apprehension function reflect the
assumption that an increase in the group size makes it costlier, both overall and at the
margin, to detect the offender. In deriving the optimal enforcement strategy under both
versions of the model, we initially treat the probability of apprehension as exogenous (in
which case c(p,n) is a fixed cost) and derive the optimal fines. We then extend the model
to allow an optimal choice of p as well.

3. Fairness is the Goal
We begin by comparing individual and group punishment when social welfare
depends on the ex post fairness of the sanction. Thus, the enforcer takes as given the fact
that the offense has been committed and seeks to impose the most appropriate
punishment. Most commonly, this implies a proportionality between the harm caused

8

We assume throughout that n is exogenous. See Levmore (1995a, pp. 1580-1582) for a discussion of how
group punishment might affects people’s decisions about whether to join a group.
5

and the punishment imposed.9 (Although deterrence is not an explicit goal, we note the
implications of the different punishment strategies for deterrence below.)
To capture the welfare benefits associated with fairness of the sanction, we
define:
B(F) = social benefit of imposing a fine of F on the true offender.10
We assume that B(F) is a single-peaked function that is maximized at a unique fine, F*,
which represents the optimal ex post sanction given the nature of the offense. Thus, B′>0
for F<F*, B′<0 for F>F*, B′(F*)=0, B″<0, and B(0)=0.11
Using this notation, we can write social welfare under the individual punishment
strategy as follows:12
SBI = pB(FI) − (1−p)σFI − c(p,n),

(1)

where, as noted above, the term (1−p)σFI reflects the expected cost of false punishment.13
Similarly, social welfare under group punishment is
SBG = B(FG) − (n−1)σFG.

(2)

In comparing these expressions, note that the benefit of punishment is realized with
certainty under group punishment, whereas it is only realized with probability p under
individual punishment. This advantage of group punishment is only achieved, however,
at the expense of higher error costs. This represents the fundamental trade-off in the
current model.
9

See, for example, Levmore (1995a, p. 1595) and Wittman (1974).
The “proportionality norm” suggests that that B is also a function of the harm caused by the offense.
Since we treat this harm as fixed, we suppress this dependence.
11
This specification follows Polinsky and Shavell (2000b). The fact that B(0)=0 implies that there is no
utility or disutility from imposing a fine of zero.
12
Note that the gain to the offender and the harm from the offense are not included here since they are sunk
at the time the punishment decision is made. We will introduce them below in the discussion of deterrence.
13
Consideration of this cost was first introduced into the economic model of crime by Harris (1970). Also
see Miceli (1991).
10
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3.1. The Optimal Strategy when p is Fixed
We begin our comparison of the two punishment strategies by considering the
case where the probability of apprehending the true offender under individual
punishment, p, is fixed. We first derive the optimal fines under each strategy, and then
compare the resulting social benefits.
The first order condition defining FI* is given by
pB′(FI) − (1−p)σ = 0,
or
1− p 
 σ .
B′(FI) = 
 p 

(3)

It follows that FI*<F* for p<1 and σ>0, where F*, recall, is the fine that maximizes
B(F). This reflects the fact that increasing F imposes greater error costs at the margin
when detection is imperfect. However, ∂FI*/∂p>0, implying that as detection improves,
the optimal fine under individual punishment increases.
An interesting special case is p=1/n, which reflects a situation where an
individual is randomly chosen from the group and punished. Suppose, for example, that
the enforcer has no ability to gather information about the offender’s identity and
members of the group are reluctant to reveal it. Thus, this case is perhaps most reflective
of small, close-knit groups, but it could also describe large societies in which an offender
can become anonymous. Since no detection effort is required to carry out random
punishment, c(1/n,n)≡0. Further, note that in this case (3) becomes
B′(FI) = (n−1)σ .

(4)

7

Now consider group punishment. The condition defining the optimal fine, FG*, is
given by
B′(FG) = (n−1)σ ,

(5)

which is identical to (4). We can therefore state the following result regarding the
optimal fines under the two punishment strategies:

Proposition 1: When p is fixed (p<1), FG*<FI*<F* for p>1/n, but FG*=FI* for p=1/n.

Generally, the optimal fine is higher under individual punishment because marginal error
costs are lower. However, when individual punishment is randomly imposed, marginal
error costs are the same under the two strategies and hence, the optimal fines are the
same.
In order to compare the strategies, substitute the optimal values of FI and FG into
(1) and (2) to obtain:
SBI* = pB(FI*) − (1−p)σFI* − c(p,n)

(6)

SBG* = B(FG*) − (n−1)σFG*.

(7)

For the case where p=1/n, (6) becomes
SBI* = [B(FI*) − (n−1)σFI*]/n = SBG*/n,

(8)

where, recall, c(1/n,n)=0. Further, the fact that FI*=FG* in this case allows us to state:

Proposition 2: Assume p=1/n where n>1. If SBI*>0, then SBG*>SBI*. However, if
SBI*<0, then SBG*<0.

8

This says that if random punishment of a single individual yields net social benefits, then
group punishment must yield strictly greater benefits. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that, if it is beneficial to punish one person chosen at random, then
punishing everyone in the group must yield n times the benefit. This reflects the fact the
benefits of punishing the true offender are derived with certainty under group punishment
but only with probability 1/n under random punishment. However, if error costs are high
enough to offset this benefit, then neither form of punishment is socially desirable.
These results show that there is a close correspondence between random
punishment and group punishment. Although only one person is punished under the
former strategy, all members of the group face an equal risk of punishment. In Section 6
we note several historical examples of this type of “punishment by lottery.”
Finally, consider the impact of group size. In terms of the optimal fines, note that
under both random individual punishment and group punishment, the optimal fine is
decreasing in n.14 This reflects the fact that under both strategies the likelihood of
wrongful punishment is increasing in the size of the group. Total welfare is also
decreasing in n under both punishment strategies.15 Under individual punishment, an
increase in n raises the cost of maintaining a given apprehension probability, whereas
under group punishment, it increases expected error costs. As a result, group size does
not have a clear impact on the choice between the two strategies.

3.2. The Optimal Strategy when p is Variable

Specifically, ∂FI*/∂n=∂FG*/∂n=σ/B″<0
This follows by differentiating (6) - (8) with respect to n and applying the Envelope Theorem when
appropriate.

14
15

9

We now turn to the case where p is chosen optimally under individual
punishment. From (1), the first order condition determining the optimal p is
B + σFI − cp = 0.

(9)

Together, (3) and (9) jointly determine FI* and p in the general case. As noted above, FI*
will be larger in this case compared to random punishment, assuming that p*>1/n. As for
overall welfare, it must be larger when p is chosen optimally than under random
punishment. Thus, for a sufficiently effective detection technology, social welfare under
individual punishment will exceed that under group punishment.
The impact of n in this case is found by differentiating (3) and (9) to obtain:
∂FI *
< 0,
∂n

∂p *
< 0.
∂n

(10)

Thus, both the optimal fine and probability of apprehension are decreasing in the size of
the group. These results reflect the higher expected error cost and higher marginal cost of
apprehension as the group gets larger.

3.3. Implications for Deterrence
Although we have assumed that the optimal punishment strategy was chosen
based on ex post concerns about fairness and the avoidance of error costs, the form of
punishment actually chosen will nevertheless have implications for deterrence, assuming
that offenders are rational. To examine this question, assume that there is a single
potential offender in the group who weighs the monetary gain from committing the
offense, g, against the expected punishment, given the punishment strategy that the

10

enforcement authority is known to employ.16 Further, suppose that g is a random variable
with distribution function Z(g), where Z′ ≡ z.
It follows that greater deterrence is achieved by the strategy that has the higher
expected fine. Thus, the comparison is between FG* under group punishment and pFI*
under individual punishment. The above results immediately imply

Proposition 3: When individual punishment is random, FG*>pFI*=FG*/n, implying that
group punishment achieves greater deterrence. However, when p is chosen optimally,
p*>1/n and FI*>FG*, in which case p * FI *

>
FG * . Thus, either form of punishment
<

may achieve more deterrence.

Group punishment achieves greater deterrence compared to random punishment
simply because, given equal fines, the offender faces punishment with certainty under
group punishment. However, this inherent advantage of group punishment regarding
deterrence is mitigated when p is chosen optimally because the fine under individual
punishment is raised above that under group punishment and p*>1/n. Thus, the expected
fine may be larger or smaller than FG*. The effect of an increase in the group size
reduces deterrence under both strategies since we have shown that FG* and p*FI* are
both decreasing in n, but, as with the comparison of welfare, it does not have a clear
effect on the choice between them.

4. Deterrence is the Goal
16

We assume that g≡0 for all members of the group besides the potential offender.
11

Standard economic models of law enforcement have focused on deterrence as the
primary social objective in determining optimal punishment strategies (Becker, 1968;
Polinsky and Shavell, 2000a). Thus, in this section we examine the choice between
individual and group punishment based on a goal of deterrence rather than ex post
fairness. (We continue to include the costs of wrongfully imposed punishment.)17 Note
that the focus on deterrence requires the enforcement authority to be able to precommit to
a punishment strategy, including both the choice between individual and group
punishment, the optimal fine, and (when relevant) the probability of apprehension.
As in the discussion of deterrence in the previous section, we assume that there is
a single potential offender in the group who compares the gain from the offense, g, to the
expected cost, where g is drawn from the distribution Z(g), which is known to the
enforcer. Also let H be the (fixed) harm to society from the offense. All other variables
are defined as above.
Under either punishment strategy, the potential offender takes a draw from the
Z(g) distribution and then commits the offense if the realized gain exceeds the expected
punishment costs. Thus, under individual punishment, the offender commits the offense
if and only if g≥pFI. Expected social welfare is therefore given by18
∞

SBI =

∫ [ g − H − (1 − p)σF ]dZ ( g ) − c( p, n) .
I

(11)

pFI

Under group punishment, the offender commits the offense if and only if g≥FG, resulting
in expected social welfare equal to
17

Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) and Miceli (1991) examine hybrid models that consider both fairness and
deterrence. We focus on a pure deterrence model here in order to make the distinction from the model in
the previous section transparent.

12

∞

SBG =

∫ [ g − H − (n − 1)σF

G

]dZ ( g ) .

(12)

FG

As above, we begin with the case where p is fixed.

4.1. The Optimal Strategy when p is Fixed
The optimal fine under individual punishment solves the first order condition

−[pFI−H−(1−p)σFI]z(pFI)p − [1−Z(pFI)](1−p)σ = 0.

(13)

Likewise, the optimal fine under group punishment solves

−[FG−H−(n−1)σFG]z(FG) − [1−Z(FG)](n−1)σ = 0.

(14)

In both cases, the marginal benefit of a higher fine in terms of the benefits of deterring
one more crime equals the marginal increase in expected error costs. Consider first the
special case of p=1/n, random punishment. In this case, (13) becomes

−[(FI/n)−H−(n−1)σ(FI/n)]z(FI/n) − [1−Z(FI/n)](n−1)σ = 0.

(15)

Comparing (14) and (15) yields the following result:

Proposition 4: Assume p=1/n, where n>1. Then FI*=nFG*, or, equivalently, pFI*=FG*.

Thus, when deterrence is the primary social goal, the optimal fine under individual
punishment is scaled up so that it results in the same level of deterrence as group
punishment. This reflects the fact that deterrence requires potential offenders to face the
correct expected fine. This is in contrast to the case where fairness was the primary goal,
in which case we showed that the optimal fines were equal.
18

This form of social welfare assumes, as is typical, that the gains to the offender should be counted as
social gains. While somewhat controversial, we retain this assumption in order to facilitate comparison of

13

Substituting the optimal fines into (11) and (12) (and recalling that c(1/n,n)=0)
immediately yields

Proposition 5: When deterrence is the primary social goal, random individual
punishment and group punishment yield equal expected social benefits.

Again this is in contrast to the case under a goal of fairness, where group punishment
yielded greater social benefits than random punishment.
Changes in group size do not affect the equivalence of the two punishment
strategies, though as above, increases in n lower social welfare under both strategies for
the same reasons. The optimal fine under group punishment varies ambiguously with n.
On the one hand, larger n lowers the optimal fine because of the higher error costs per
dollar of the imposed fine, but on the other, larger n raises the optimal fine because the
increased deterrence lowers the expected number crimes and hence the expected number
of wrongful punishments. The ambiguity here is due to the second effect, which was not
present in the model based on fairness. The effect of n on the optimal individual fine
(under random punishment) is also ambiguous since FI*=nFG*. However, if the direct
effect of n is dominant, then FI* will be increasing in the size of the group.

4.2. The Optimal Strategy when p is Variable
The derivative of (11) with respect to p is
−[pFI−H−(1−p)σFI]z(pFI)FI + [1−Z(pFI)]σFI − cp = 0.

(16)

our results to the literature. See the discussion and references cited in Polinsky and Shavell (2000a, p. 48).
14

This condition says that enforcement effort should be increased to the point where the
marginal cost of increasing p equals the net reduction in harm from the marginal offense
plus the reduction in expected error costs for all offenses that are committed. Together,
(13) and (16) jointly determine FI and p.
Note that since we showed above that welfare was the same under the two
punishment strategies when p=1/n, it must be true that when p is chosen optimally,
individual punishment yields higher social welfare (assuming that p*>1/n). Thus, we
have

Proposition 6: When the primary benefit of punishment is deterrence and p is chosen
optimally under individual punishment, then individual punishment is preferred to group
punishment.

At this point it is worth comparing optimal enforcement under individual
punishment in the current model to previously established results from the standard
(pure) deterrence model (Polinksy and Shavell, 2000a). The key difference here is the
inclusion in social welfare of costs associated with wrongful punishment as captured by

σ>0. This reflects the fact that someone is punished in the current model, and society
bears a cost if it is not the true offender.19 This leads to two departures from the standard
model. First, the optimal fine is not generally maximal (i.e., equal to the offender’s
wealth) as it is in the standard model. It would, however, be maximal in the current

19

In contrast, it is not clear in the standard literature (as surveyed by Polinsky and Shavell (2000a)) whether
anyone is punished if the true offender is not identified. That is, it is not clear whether 1−p represents the
probability that no one is punished, or that someone is incorrectly punished. Here, it is clearly the latter.
(Of course, this distinction does not matter if σ=0.)
15

model if σ=0. To see why, assume σ=0 and set FI below the offender’s wealth. Then by
raising FI and lowering p such that pFI remains fixed, welfare will increase because the
first term in (11) will be unchanged (given σ=0), but c(p,n) will fall. This proves that
setting FI less than maximal cannot be welfare-maximizing. However, when σ>0, this
reasoning does not apply because raising FI and lowering p cause an increase in expected
error costs. Thus, it will not generally be true that FI* is maximal in the current model.
When FI* is not maximal, condition (13), which determines the optimal fine,
holds with equality at the optimum. This implies that
pFI − H < (1−p)σFI.

(17)

>
Since the right-hand side of (17) is positive, pFI H. This is again in contrast to the
<
standard enforcement model with σ=0, where pFI<H at the optimum. Thus, in the pure
deterrence model with no consideration of error costs, there is some underdeterrence at
the optimum in the sense that the marginal crime imposes more costs on society than it
yields in benefits to the offender. This is optimal because the marginal benefit of
deterring one more crime must be balanced against the marginal cost of increasing p to
achieve greater deterrence. When error costs are taken into account, however (i.e., when

σ>0), this conclusion does not necessarily hold because increasing p yields a social
benefit in terms of reducing marginal error costs. Thus, it cannot be determined whether
pFI is larger or smaller than H at the optimum.

5. Extensions

This section discusses several extensions of the analysis.

16

5.1. Use of Non-monetary Sanctions
We first consider the impact of using non-monetary sanctions such as prison,
warfare, or execution rather than fines.20 The key difference is that non-monetary
sanctions are costly to impose. It turns out, however, that this change does not have a
significant qualitative effect on our basic conclusions. To see this, let s be the dollar
value of the non-monetary sanction to the offender, and let α be a scaling factor that
reflects the marginal social cost of s to society (whereα>1 if the cost to the offender is
part of social costs, as is usually assumed). Thus, the social cost of imposing the sanction
is αs. In the fairness model, the social benefit of imposing the sanction continues to be
B(s), which has the same properties as above (though the value of s that maximizes B
may be different), and the expected sanction for purposes of deterrence is ps.
Social welfare under the two strategies remains essentially the same as under the
fine, except that the total cost of punishment is higher. Under individual punishment, it is
given by
[(1−p)σ + α]sI,

(18)

while under group punishment it is
[(n−1)σ + nα]sG.

(19)

Thus, the marginal cost of punishment is higher. The result is that the dollar-equivalent
sanction will be lower than the optimal fine, but all other results are essentially
unaffected. For example, in the special case where p=1/n (random punishment), (18)
becomes
[(n−1)σ + nα]sI/n.

(20)

17

Thus, total costs under individual punishment are simply 1/n times total costs under
group punishment, as was true when the sanction was a fine. It follows that when fairness
is the goal, group punishment is preferred over random individual punishment (assuming
any punishment is desirable) and the sanctions are identical. Similarly, when deterrence
is the goal, group and random punishment yield equal social benefits, and sI*=nsG*. It
also continues to be true that individual punishment will tend to dominate in both cases if
the detection technology is sufficiently effective.
The preceding has assumed that the marginal cost of punishment is constant as the
group size increases. If marginal costs were instead increasing in n, as is perhaps true of
imprisonment, this would tend to reduce the desirability of group punishment for larger
groups. However, for other non-monetary sanctions, like warfare, there may be
decreasing marginal costs (due to scale economies), which would give an advantage to
group punishment as group size increases.
5.2. Possibility that the Group will Turn Over the Offender
One possible motivation for using group punishment is to give innocent members
of the group an incentive to turn over the true offender (Levmore, 1995a). The difficulty
with this “information extraction” rationale is that, while group members may have an
incentive to turn someone over in order to avoid punishment, they do not necessarily have
an incentive to turn over the guilty party. Thus, absent independent evidence, it is not
clear that the outcome in this case is different from that under random punishment, which
we have seen is inferior to group punishment in terms of fairness, and equivalent in terms
of deterrence.

20

The usual economic motivation for imposing non-monetary sanctions is that offenders might have
insufficient wealth to pay the fine (the so-called judgment proof problem) (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000a).
18

Suppose for the moment, though, that the group’s revelation is believable. (For
example, suppose the enforcer requires the group to simultaneously turn over evidence of
the offender’s guilt.) Then we might capture this aspect of group punishment by defining
a function q(FG), which is the probability that the group will turn over the offender when
each member of the group is threatened with a fine of FG. While abstracting from the
details of the group’s decision making, it seems reasonable to assume that q′>0, or, the
larger is the group sanction, the more likely it is that the group will turn over the
offender.21
In this formulation of group punishment, social welfare under the fairness and
deterrence versions of the model, respectively, are given by
SBG = q(FG)B(FT) + (1−q(FG))[B(FG)− (n−1)σFG]

(21)

∞

SBG = ∫ [ g − H − (1 − q( FG ))(n − 1)σFG ]dZ ( g ) ,

(22)

f

where FT is the fine imposed on an offender turned over by the group, and
f≡qFT+(1−q)FG is the expected fine a potential offender faces.22 Not surprisingly, the
possibility that the group will turn over the offender enhances the desirability of group
punishment in both versions of the model. It continues to be true, however, that
individual punishment is preferred over group punishment in both models if the detection
technology is sufficiently accurate, though the required level of accuracy is higher than in
the case where q≡0. Thus, the possible information extraction function of group
punishment is most appealing when evidence gathering is difficult.

21

It is not clear how q would vary with n. Smaller groups may be more reluctant to turn over one of their
own, but offenders may find it easier to remain anonymous in large groups. A formal model of group
decision making would be necessary to resolve this issue.
22
Obviously, these expressions reduce to (2) and (12), respectively, when q=0.
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5.3. Possibility that the Offender will Turn Himself In
Another possible rationale for group punishment is that the offender might be
induced to turn himself in, presumably in hopes of receiving a more lenient punishment
than he would otherwise receive under the optimal policy.23 Of course, the same
possibility exists under individual punishment. To illustrate, let Fjs be the fine imposed
on an offender who turns himself in under enforcement strategy j=I,G. Incentive
compatibility requires that FIs≤pFI under individual punishment (assuming risk neutrality
of the offender), and FGs≤FG under group punishment.24 To the extent that offenders are
rational and choose to confess, this scheme improves welfare under both punishment
strategies and under both social objectives by reducing error costs, and, in the case of
individual punishment, enforcement costs.25 It does not, however, give an obvious
advantage to either punishment strategy, and hence is not a clear rationale for threatening
group punishment (unless the offender is known to suffer disutility when members of his
group are wrongfully punished, as may be true, for example, when the group is a family).
5.4. The Impact of the Offender’s Risk Preference
We have followed the literature in assuming that potential offenders are risk
neutral, but in the current context, the risk preferences of the offender may affect the
choice between the two punishment strategies in two ways. First, if the offender is risk
averse, then individual punishment will result in greater deterrence than group
punishment, all else equal, because individual punishment is uncertain.26 In contrast, if
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Levmore (1995a) discusses this motivation for group punishment and proposes an incentive compatible
scheme along the lines described here.
24
Note the analogy to plea bargaining in criminal prosecution.
25
A further benefit in the fairness model is due to the fact that B(pFI)>pB(FI) given the concavity of B.
26
Specifically, if pFI=FG, the offender’s utility under group punishment will be greater than his expected
utility under individual punishment, assuming diminishing marginal utility of income.
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the offender is risk loving (as is sometimes claimed about criminals (Becker, 1968)), then
the reverse will be true. Second, risk averse offenders will be more willing to turn
themselves in under individual as compared to group punishment, whereas risk averse
offenders will be less inclined to do so.

6. Examples of Group Punishment

This section discusses several examples of group punishment in light of the
theory. The discussion is not meant to be exhaustive but merely illustrative of the scope
of group punishment schemes, both historically and in modern law enforcement.
6.1. Ancient Examples
Posner (1983: pp. 193-195) notes that one of the defining characteristics of
primitive law enforcement is its reliance on collective, or group responsibility. If a person
harmed another, primitive law allowed the victim’s kinsmen to seek compensation from
the injurer or any of his kinsmen, and if they refused to pay, to retaliate against the injurer
or his kinsmen. Even a state as advanced as ancient Greece believed that a murderer
“polluted” his city and his family, creating a form of collective guilt that extended to the
murderer’s descendants (Posner, 1983: p. 217). Of course, the most famous example is
the pollution of Thebes caused by Oedipus’s murder of his father.27
The Bible, especially the Old Testament, is also replete with various examples of
group responsibility in ancient society. The stories of Noah’s flood28 and Sodom and
Gomorrah29 dramatically portray the notion that the sins of some pollute an entire
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A more modern example is found in the work of Nathaniel Hawthorne, which similarly evinces “the
theme that the sins of the father are visited upon the children” (Buel, 1986, p. 360).
28
Genesis, 7
29
Genesis, 19.
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community for which the guilty and innocent alike must pay. (Of course, if all citizens of
these communities were sinners, then these are not true examples of group punishment—
the stories are not specific on this point.)
An example of random punishment is found in the story of Jonah.30 The story
begins with Jonah boarding a ship to escape God’s command to go to the wicked city of
Nineveh to serve as a missionary. To punish Jonah’s defiance, God creates a severe storm
that threatens to destroy the ship and all its crew. The mariners therefore cast lots to
detect the person whose transgression brought about the storm, and when Jonah is
miraculously identified as the guilty party, the mariners throw him overboard. The fact
that Jonah was correctly identified by the lottery (obviously through divine intervention)
can only be seen as legitimizing this type of punishment in the eyes of readers.
The New Testament story of Herod’s attempt to locate and kill the baby Jesus is
perhaps the most extreme Biblical example of group punishment.31 After learning of the
birth of the King of the Jews in the vicinity of Bethlehem, Herod first attempted to locate
the child by sending the wise men. When that “individual punishment” strategy failed, he
ordered the slaughter of all children less than two years of age in the region. This story is
a good illustration of the attractiveness of group punishment when detection is difficult
and punishment of the innocent is not seen as costly. It is more likely, however, that the
story was meant to be interpreted as a critique of this particularly hash form of group
punishment, reflecting the transition to a more modern view of punishment.
Our final example of group punishment in ancient law is found in the Hammurabi
Code (Levmore, 1995b: p. 117), which provided that a victim of robbery, if unable to

30
31

Jonah, 1:1-15.
Matthew, 2:1-16.
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identify the guilty party, could collect compensation from the city in which the robbery
occurred. Likewise, the kinsmen of a murder victim could seek compensation from the
city in which the murder occurred. A similar provision existed in old English law as
chronicled by Blackstone in his Commentaries. In particular, the residents of a village in
which a man was robbed were obliged to “make hue and cry after the felon,” and if they
failed to locate him, were collectively liable for “damages equivalent to his loss.”32
These examples also signal a transition from ancient to modern practices in their
emphasis on “compensation” of victims rather than “punishment” of injurers. We pursue
this point in the next section.
On a theoretical level, the pervasiveness of group punishment in ancient society
can be explained based on two characteristics of primitive law enforcement: the concept
of punishment as revenge (Holmes, 1881: p. 6; Posner, 1983: Chapter 8), and the lack of
a specialized (state run) police force with a monopoly on law enforcement. In terms of
the model, these characteristics suggest that the primary social objective was fairness, or
proportionality of punishment (“an eye for an eye”), and that the technology of detection
was ineffective or non-existent, both of which we showed are necessary conditions for
group punishment to be preferred to individual punishment.
6.2. Modern Examples
To modern sensibilities, the greatest objection to group punishment is the
punishment of the innocent along with the guilty. Nevertheless, modern examples of
group responsibility are more pervasive than conventional wisdom suggests (Levmore,
1995b). In contrast to primitive society, however, they tend to involve situations where
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Commentaries, Book III, Chapter 9, p. 161.
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“innocent” members of the group are in some sense culpable, or, what amounts to the
same thing, where the cost of punishing the innocent is not seen as being high.
An example of the first type of situation is the imposition of sanctions, or the
waging of warfare, against countries harboring terrorists.33 As Levmore (1995b: p. 99)
notes that “We are accustomed to the fact that war claims the lives of innocent people,”
and “one nation may be justified in warring against another when the other nation is
unable to control the actions of some of its inhabitants.” Another military example of a
different sort is the execution by lottery of soldiers in companies that broke during
combat, a form of discipline employed by the Italian army during WW I (Gooch, 1996).
In both cases, there is a sense in which members of the group besides the guilty party are
at least somewhat culpable, and that group punishment is both an effective way to induce
them to reveal the culprit’s identity and to deter future offenses.
As suggested above, however, group responsibility in modern society more
typically involves situations where the goal is compensation of victims rather than
punishment of offenders. In such situations, which are more reflective of tort law than
criminal law,34 imposition of liability on someone other than the responsible party is not
seen as imposing a large social cost, and indeed is often an effective way to achieve the
goal of deterrence. Examples include various forms of vicarious liability like the doctrine
of respondeat superior, under which an employer can be held responsible for torts
committed by his employees; the related criminal law rule that corporations may be held
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Such actions are not without precedent in history. A famous ancient example was the sack of Troy by
the Greeks in retaliation for the kidnap of Helen, which archeologists have shown was likely an historical
event (Wood, 1998).
34
Primitive society did really draw a distinction between torts and crimes, primarily because there did not
exist a state to carry out criminal enforcement (Posner, 1983: Chapter 7).
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criminally liable for crimes committed by employees;35 and joint and several liability,
under which any one of a group of injurers can be held liable for the victim’s entire loss
regardless of their particular contribution.36 These forms of liability promote deterrence
when offenders are out of reach of victims or law enforcers, and those subject to liability
are in a position to monitor their actions (Varian, 1990).
A famous tort case provides a concrete example of the court’s willingness to use
group punishment in this context. In Ybarra v. Spangard,37 the court ruled that a patient
injured during an operation could jointly collect from several health professionals for the
negligence of one of them. This case reflects a general class of torts in which courts
apportion damages in the presence of uncertainty over causation (Shavell, 1985), but it is
unique in an important respect—the members of the group in this case presumably knew
the identity of the negligent party but were reluctant to reveal that information. The
threat of group punishment in such a setting may therefore be an effective way to
encourage monitoring of precaution before the fact (thus promoting deterrence) and
revelation of information after the fact (thus saving on detection costs).
Levmore (1995a) suggests that a better ruling in such a case might have been to
threaten each of the defendants with liability in excess of the victim’s damages unless the
responsible party was identified. Compared to the sharing rule of Ybarra, Levmore
argues that this “overextraction rule” has the twin virtues of enhancing the incentives of
innocent members of the group to turn in the offender,38 and giving the offender an
incentive to confess. The obvious disadvantage is that it entails especially high error
35

As Garoupa (2000, p. 244) notes, “Within the context of corporate liability, shareholders become quasienforcers.”
36
As Menell (1991: p. 109) notes, under joint and several liability, “disposal of a thimbleful of hazardous
waste at a large disposal site exposes an entity to enormous potential liability.”
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costs if neither of these outcomes occurs.39 The proposal is therefore not a practical one,
but it nevertheless helps bring into focus the trade-off involved in the use of group
punishment schemes.

7. Conclusion

This paper has examined the choice between individual and group punishment
when the enforcement authority is uncertain about the offender’s identity but knows he is
a member of a well-defined group. We considered this choice in the context of two
social objectives: ex post fairness of punishment and deterrence. The results of the
theoretical analysis showed that when fairness is the goal and the enforcer cannot invest
in detection, group punishment is preferred to individual (random) punishment (assuming
punishment is desirable). However, the possibility of investing in detection raises the
payoff from individual punishment both by increasing the fairness benefits of punishment
and reducing the likelihood of error costs. If strong enough, these effects make
individual punishment preferable.
When deterrence is the main goal of punishment and the enforcer cannot invest in
detection, individual and group punishment yield equal social benefits. However, when
the enforcer can invest in detection, individual punishment is again preferred.
Our survey of various examples of group punishment suggested that these results
broadly conform to the greater use of group punishment schemes in ancient times when
detection was difficult and vengeance was the predominant objective of punishment. In
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154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
Though it also likely increases the risk that they will misidentify him.
39
For example, a rational offender might refuse to confess knowing that the enforcer will not actually carry
out the threatened penalty (Levmore, 1995a, p. 1595). In other words, the policy is not time-consistent.
38
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contrast, improvements in the technology of law enforcement, aversion to punishing the
innocent, and the shift in emphasis toward deterrence are consistent with the modern
reliance on individual punishment. This is not to say the group punishment is nonexistence in modern society. As we saw, however, modern examples are more subtle
than in ancient times and tend to be used in civil as opposed to criminal law settings
where compensation of victims is important, and severing the link between punishment
and responsibility is not seen as overly costly.
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